










Tax Incentives for CO2-EOR  




Professor Alexander G. Kemp  
and 






December, 2014   
 
 
Aberdeen Centre for Research in Energy Economics and 
Finance (ACREEF) 





NORTH SEA ECONOMICS 
 
Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department 
since 1973.  The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the 
Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish 
Office.  The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on 
Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978.  In more recent years further work has 
been done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and 
characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. 
 
The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation.  Work in this field was initially 
financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by 
the Shell Grants Committee.  Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal 
systems in other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia.  Because of the continuing interest in 
the UK fiscal system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. 
 
From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed 
research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, 
Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands.  A main part of this work involved the 
construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to 
measure the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development 
risks. 
 
Over the last few years the research has examined the many evolving economic issues 
generally relating to petroleum investment and related fiscal and regulatory matters.  
Subjects researched include the economics of incremental investments in mature oil 
fields, economic aspects of the CRINE initiative, economics of gas developments and 
contracts in the new market situation, economic and tax aspects of tariffing, 
economics of infrastructure cost sharing, the effects of comparative petroleum fiscal 
systems on incentives to develop fields and undertake new exploration, the oil price 
responsiveness of the UK petroleum tax system, and the economics of 
decommissioning, mothballing and re-use of facilities.  This work has been financed 
by a group of oil companies and Scottish Enterprise, Energy.  The work on CO2 
Capture, EOR and storage was financed by a grant from the Natural Environmental 
Research Council (NERC) in the period 2005 – 2008.  
 
For 2014 the programme examines the following subjects: 
 
a) Prospective Full Cycle Returns from Future Exploration 
b) Brownfield Allowance, EOR, and Decommissioning Relief 
c) Comparison of UK and Norwegian Petroleum Taxation Systems 
d) Effects of Decommissioning Relief Deed on Incremental Investments 
e) Economics of Shale Gas 
f) Access to Capital 
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g) Assessment of Wood Review 
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The UK Government has routinely introduced tax incentives to maximise 
economic oil and gas extraction in the UKCS, including for EOR 
schemes.  But CO2-EOR schemes have thus far been excluded, despite 
the widespread acknowledgment that a major barrier to the deployment of 
CCS investments in general and CO2-EOR in particular, is their relative 
costliness in relation to the revenues.  Yet, CO2-EOR could provide 
roughly 60% of the estimated 1.5 billion barrels of oil producible through 
EOR (DECC, 2009).  The present study explores how the economics of 
CO2-EOR investments might benefit from an extension to it of several 
possible tax incentives including the Brown Field Allowance (BFA) and 
an investment uplift akin to that proposed for ultra high pressure, high 
temperature fields. 
 
2. Methodology  
It is assumed that, having resolved the technical, engineering, geological 
and CO2 feedstock issues, the single most important consideration 
militating against a CO2-EOR investment is the project costs in relation to 
the prospective revenues.    This study attempts to solve the problem by 
investigating a package of targeted fiscal incentives that might make the 
projects more attractive by reducing the difference between pre-tax and 
post-tax returns.  
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In order to demonstrate that fiscal incentives are needed to encourage 
first-mover technical- and financial risks relating to commercial scale 
CO2-EOR projects, a hybrid spreadsheet model (in Excel) reflecting real-
world financial and physical (reservoir simulation, production) conditions 
was formulated from the perspective of private sector investors, and 
optimised with respect to project net present value (NPV), subject to the 
constraints of profit non-negativity, and oil production determined by 
reservoir engineering principles underpinned by physical laws relating to 
the CO2-injection-oil yield.  The yield factor embodies decreasing EOR 
in relation to the cumulative amount of CO2 injected.  The input 
assumptions and parameters are based on a literature review and 
knowledge of real-world conditions.    
 
CO2-EOR projects are normally designed as a closed loop system in 
which the process is kick started with imported CO2.  The produced oil 
contains some CO2 which is captured, recompressed, combined with 
more imported CO2 and re-injected to produce oil.  The process is 
repeated for as long as profitability continues.  Apart from producing 
more oil, the assumed continuous CO2 recycle process serves the two 
useful purposes of (a) steadily reducing the project OPEX by eventually 
reducing the amount of purchased CO2, and, (b) ensuring that the 
produced CO2 is not released to the atmosphere.  The following vector 
autoregressive model in Kemp and Kasim (2013) relating the annual 
volumes of the fresh (or purchased) and recycled CO2 and the 
hydrocarbon gas produced at the oilfield was used to reservoir 
engineering principles into the financial model.   
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎𝑜 + a1fresht-1 + a2recyt-1 + a3hcgast-1 + a4oilt-2 +𝜀1𝑡                                      (2) 
recyt     = b0  + b1fresht-1 + b2recyt-1 + b3hcgast-1 + b4oilt-2  +𝜀2𝑡                                       (3) 




fresht = the volume of fresh CO2 purchased and injected at period t 
recyt = the volume of CO2 produced and recycled at time t 
hcgast = the volume of hydrocarbon gas produced at time t 




=error term                      i = 1,2,3 
 
The error term captures any “incidental sequestration”
1
  that may occur in 
the reservoir.   The volume of oil produced at t-2 is exogenous and a 
proxy for the remaining oil reserves. 
 
Given the optimised cash flow streams, a scenario analysis technique was 
then deployed to investigate the financial consequences to the streams of 
various tax allowances that might be applied to encourage CO2-EOR 
investments.  In particular, the analysis addressed the specific question of 
whether or not the CO2-EOR projects could be economically developed.  
The following are the key assumptions and parameters of the scenario 
analysis: 
3. Assumptions 
i. Key model assumptions: 
Whilst the detailed assumptions and parameters of the optimisation model 
can be found in Kemp and Kasim (2013), the following are especially 
noteworthy:   
a. Timeline 
Platform modification, well re-work, pipeline refurbishment and/or new 
build as well as field re-opening where necessary are assumed to 
                                                 
1
 Defined as the injected CO2 that is trapped within the geologic formation and does not come back up 
with the EOR oil.  Between 5% and 10% of the purchased CO2 remain permanently trapped or 
sequestered in the reservoir (Melzer, 2012).  
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commence in 2020.  The injection of purchased and recycled CO2 
commences in 2023, initially with the former alone.  The (percentage) 
preponderance of purchased CO2 in the total amount injected annually, 
while remaining constant in absolute terms, reduces over time and ceases 
in 2042.  First oil is produced in 2025, rising to a peak and declining 
thereafter at an increasing pace towards the end of the study period in 
2050, reflecting diminishing returns to the CO2 EOR activity.  The exact 
date is determined by the economic limit. 
 
b. Oil and CO2 transfer prices 
Oil prices are expected to be volatile during the period.  As an example 
the EIA (2014) forecast a Reference scenario oil price ranging from $97 
to $142 per barrel (real 2012).  The present study assumed $120 per 
barrel in real terms, given that the projects commence several years into 
the future, namely 2020. 
   
Two delivered CO2 prices are considered.  One is zero and the other a 
relatively modest price of £9/tCO2
2
.  The zero carbon price is assumed in 
the study to be a proxy for commercial incentivisation, given the 





ii. Scenario analysis : assumptions and parameters 
Two sets of scenarios were run with the current and hypothetical levels of 
the BFA and investment uplift allowances respectively. 
                                                 
2
 The average price is $25 or £16 per tonne Onshore USA (Melzer, 2012).   This price is tied/coupled 
to the oil price by a certain percentage (1.5% to 2.5%), where carbon prices are stated as per mcf of  
CO2 (NEORI, 2012) 
3
 DECC – PILOT Meeting – 10 November 2009. 
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(i) The BFA: Unit and maximum available allowance 
variations 
As from the 7
th
 September 2012, qualifying EOR projects that “maximise 
economic recovery of hydrocarbons” are entitled to claim Brown Field 
Allowances (BFAs).   Qualifying projects include those designed to 
maximise oil and gas tertiary production in and around existing producing 
fields.   Because of concerns regarding cost apportionment across the 
upstream/downstream boundaries, the BFA does not apply to CO2-EOR 
projects.  Given the assurance that the possible eventual inclusion of CO2-
EOR projects would be kept under review (DECC, 2013)
4
 this study 
assumes that these projects could be included in the future.  
 
Currently, the maximum BFA per barrel of incremental reserves is 
around £6.82 (£50/tonne) for qualifying projects whose expected 
minimum capital cost (CAPEX) is around £8.19/barrel (£60/tonne) of 
incremental reserve.  The maximum allowance is for a project having a 
verified CAPEX of around £10.91 (£80/tonne) or more.  There are caps 
on the aggregate allowance for a PRT-paying project of £500 million, 
£250 million for a non-PRT one.   
 
In the experimental runs, the BFA per barrel was increased to 
(£13.64/bbl., £100/tonne), (£27.29/bbl., £200/tonne), and (£34.11/bbl., 
£250/tonne), with the overall caps removed where expedient.   Fig. 1 




                                                 
4
 DECC, BFA Guidance 
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Fig. 1: Brown Field Unit Allowance variations 
 
In Fig. 1 the BFAs in per barrel terms are drawn along the y-axis and the 
expected CAPEX per barrel of incremental reserves along the x-axis.   
(ii) Investment uplift allowance 
In order to further incentivise exploration and production activities in the 
UKCS, the Government has committed to a new cluster area allowance 
for u-HPHT oil and gas projects.  As its name implies, the u-HPHT uplift 
is a tax relief additional to the original oil and gas production CAPEX 
relieved on 100% first year basis.  The confirmed minimum level of the 
proposed allowance is 62.5% of the qualifying CAPEX incurred in a 
cluster area.   The study experimented with hypothetical allowances of 
62.5%, 70%, 75% and 80% for CO2 EOR projects. 
 
iii. PRT, Supplementary Charge and tax-basis variations 
For both sets of experiments involving the BFA and uplift allowances, the 
sensitivities of the resulting NPVs with respect to PRT and SC rate 




a. PRT rate variations 
The Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) is a field-based tax on the profits of 
oil and gas operators in the UK/UKCS.  The current rate is 50%.  Kemp 
and Kasim (2013) demonstrated that exempting taxable fields which 
engage in CO2-EOR from PRT payments would significantly improve the 
profitability of CO2-EOR investments. However, given that the 
government might not be inclined to levy a zero rate, the study 
experimented with reduction to 25% and 17.5% rates respectively. 
b. Supplementary Charge – rate  
Oil and gas companies in the UK/UKCS pay Supplementary Charge (SC) 
on their ring fence profits at the current rate of 32%.  Experimental runs 
were conducted by reducing the SC from the current 32% to 25%.   
c. Supplementary Charge – allowances  
Two allowances are considered.  One is the current BFA which is 
CAPEX-based for qualifying projects and the other is a hypothetical 
Total cost-basis, including partial or full OPEX.  Total cost with full 
OPEX is the sum of the CAPEX and the cumulative OPEX up to the last 
date of CO2 purchases.  The second case is total cost with partial OPEX 
only which adds only the development phase OPEX to the CAPEX. 
 
4. Selected Fields 
Four fields of varying sizes and CO2-EOR potential were selected as case 
studies.  These are Brae, Buzzard, Claymore and Miller.  Map 1 shows 
the relative geographical locations of the selected fields while Table 1 




Map 1: Location of selected case study oilfields in the UKCS 
 
Source: adapted from Kemp and Kasim (2013) 
 
Map 1 shows that the selected fields are in relative close proximity to one 
another and, can form a cluster area along the St-Fergus-to-Miller 





Table 1: Summary of cost profiles of selected hypothetical CO2 EOR 
Projects in the UKCS 
 Brae Buzzard Claymore Miller 
Potential EOR (mmbbls) 
 
33 94 69 53 
Investment cost (£m. real) 
 
316 802 719 601 
Investment cost per barrel 
($/bbl.) 
 
15 15 17 18 
Lifetime Operating cost` 
(£m. real) 
(excl. CO2 cost) 
838 996 1320 698 
Operating cost per barrel 
($/bbl.) 
 
41 17 31 21 
Lifetime Operating Cost 
(£m. real) 
(incl. CO2 at £9/tCO2) 
1132 1760 1838 1056 
Operating Cost  (incl. 
CO2) per barrel ($/bbl.) 
 
55 30 43 32 
Source: Kemp and Kasim (2013) 
 
Brae 
The Brae oilfield complex is located some 230 km from St. Fergus, the 
assumed onshore CO2 gathering and distribution hub.  The field lies at a 
water depth of 106 metres. The estimated OOIP is 610 mmbbls.  
Production started in 1983, and thus Brae is PRT-paying.  The water cut 
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reached 73% in 2012.  Table 1 indicates that an estimated 33 million 
barrels of CO2-EOR oil could be produced with a CAPEX real cost of 
£316 million or about £9.6 ($15.4) per barrel.  The total project cost 
including the cumulative OPEX is £1.4 billion, or about £44 ($70) per 
barrel if the CO2 was purchased at the price of £9/tCO2.  If commercial 
incentivisation resulted in the delivered cost of the CO2 being zero, the 




Fig.2 shows the historic and EOR potential of the Brae field complex.  
The business-as-usual (BAU) schedule is the estimated production 
without CO2-EOR, while the total oil schedule includes the addition from 

















































































































Fig. 2: Brae: Business as Usual (BAU) and 






Buzzard is located 62 km from St. Fergus and lies at a water depth of 100 
metres.  The field’s OOIP is c.1200 mmbbls with water cut at 21% in 
2012, suggesting a greater volume of potential CO2-EOR oil than Brae.  
Buzzard is a non-PRT-paying field. 
 
Table 1 indicates the field’s estimated CO2-EOR potential of 94 mmbbls, 
producible with a real CAPEX cost of £802 million, or about £8.6 ($13.7) 
per barrel.  If the delivered cost of the captured CO2 is zero, the estimated 
total project cost is £1.8 billion or about £19 ($31) per barrel.  Paying a 
positive price for the captured CO2 of £9 per tonne results in a total 




Fig. 3 shows the production profile of the potential additional oil at 
Buzzard and the field life extension as a result of CO2-EOR, if the 






Claymore is located some 141 km from St. Fergus and lies at a water 
depth of 104 metres.  The field’s estimated OOIP is 1460 mmbbls.  
Production started in 1977 and so Claymore is a PRT-paying field.  The 
field is relatively mature with water cut at 78% in 2012.   
    
Table 1 shows that the estimated incremental CO2-EOR oil is 69 mmbbls 
produced at a real capital cost of £719 million or about £10.4 ($16.7) per 
barrel.  The total project cost is estimated at $2.0 billion or about £29.6 
($47.3) per barrel, if the captured CO2 was delivered at zero cost.  This 
increases to £2.6 billion or about £37.1 ($59.3) if the captured CO2 was 
delivered at a price of £9/tCO2. 
 
 
Fig. 4 shows the difference which the CO2-EOR project can potentially 
make to the field’s production profile both in terms of the annual 
increases in production and the field life extension.   
 
Miller 
Miller is located 242 km from St. Fergus to which it is linked by a 30-
inch gas pipeline.  The pipeline is the backbone serving the cluster of four 
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fields in the sample formed around it.  Miller lies at a water depth of 100 
metres.  Oil production ceased in 2007, but the study assumes that it can 
be re-opened for CO2-EOR under favourable techno-economic 
conditions.  As a reopened field it is assumed that like Argyll/Ardmore/ 
Alma it will be a non-PRT field. 
 
The estimated incremental CO2-EOR oil is 53 mmbbls at a real CAPEX 
of £601 million or about £11.3 ($18.1) per barrel.  If the delivered 
captured CO2 was zero-valued, the estimated total project cost is £1.3 
billion or about £24.5 ($39.2) per barrel.  However, if the CO2 was 
delivered at £9/tCO2, the estimated project cost rises to £1.7 billion or 




Fig. 5 shows the potential CO2-EOR oil production profile.  In this case 
there is no BAU oil projection because the field has already ceased 
production.  The production profile shows output being ramped up in four 


































































































































followed by a three-year production plateau (2029-2031) and decline 
from 2032.   
 
5. Financial Simulations Undertaken 
Experimental runs were conducted to investigate the financial 
consequences on project profitability of various tax schemes as discussed 
above.  In each set, a base scenario was first developed, its profitability 
index (NPV@10%/I@10% discount rate) analysed, and then subjected to 
variations in some of the original data input/parameter assumptions.  A 
hurdle rate of NPV/I ˃ 0.3 is conventionally assumed to be desired for 
investments in the UKCS. 
 
6. Results 
The field-by-field experimental results are presented in Tables 2 to 6.  
The graphical summaries are in two sets of panels.  The left hand side 
(LHS) panels include an assumed commercial incentivisation scheme 
which delivers CO2 at zero price to the fields as well as tax incentives, 
while the right hand side (RHS) panels are based on the fiscal incentives 
and payment for CO2 of £9/tCO2 in real terms. 
  
(a) Brae 
The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR 
The results of the experiments investigating the possible effectiveness of 
an enhancement of BFAs for CO2-EOR at Brae are presented in Table 2.  
The project hurdle rate is a minimum NPV/I ratio of 0.3 in this and all 




Table 2: Brae: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, given BFAs 
(CAPEX-based) and captured CO2 prices. 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with captured 
CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with captured 
CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
Fig.2.1a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% Fig. 2.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 2.1b: PRT @ 25% Fig. 2.2b: PRT @ 25% 
  
Fig. 2.1c:  PRT @ 17.5% Fig. 2.2c:  6 PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
Fig.2.1a summarises the results of the base case with combined 
commercial and fiscal incentives.  Before tax the NPV/I ratio exceeds 0.5.  
Under the status quo of paying PRT at 50% and not receiving any BFAs 
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for CO2-EOR projects, the NPV/I is a mere 0.091, clearly non-viable 
from the perspective of the field operator.  Selected current and 
hypothetical larger levels of the BFA were applied to the CO2-EOR 
project.  Thus, the NPV/I improves by 15% to 0.105 if the current level of 
the BFA was extended to the CO2-EOR project.  This is still significantly 
below the investment hurdle rate.  Successive increases in the BFA up to 
five times the current level raised the potential NPV/I to a maximum 
0.159.  Clearly the combined incentivisation scheme is inadequate, at the 
chosen levels of the BFA and current PRT.  It may be noted that this 
conclusion remains the same even when the SC rate was reduced to 25% 
as the maximum NPV/I increased by only 3% to 0.163. 
 
Fig. 2.2.a summarises the corresponding results of the base case scenario 
with fiscal incentives only with the investor paying £9 per tonne in real 
terms for its CO2 feedstock.  Unsurprisingly, the project economics are 
much worse.  The pre-tax NPV/I ratio becomes 0.22.  The best post-tax 
NPV/I ratio is 35% lower (at NPV/I = 0.104) than with the commercial 
incentive case. 
 
Fig. 2.1b summarises the results of reducing the PRT rate to 25% in the 
fiscal-with-commercial incentives base case.  Halving the PRT rate 
increases the profitability index along with the most generous BFA by 
31% (NPV/I = 0.209).  Halving the PRT rate is insufficient to reach the 
investment hurdle.   
 
Fig. 2.2b summarises the results of halving the PRT rate in the fiscal-
incentive-only base case scenario.  The 20% improvement in this 
scenario’s NPV/I ratio (to 0.125) over its base case, is lower than its 
corresponding fiscal-plus-commercial incentive case (Fig. 2.1b).  Again, 
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the profitability of the fiscal-incentive-only case does not match that of 
the corresponding combined incentives, and the NPV/I ratio is well below 
0.3 even with a very large BFA. 
 
In Fig. 2.1c, the PRT rate is reduced further to 17.5%.  This produces a 
57% improvement in the NPV/I ratio to 0.249 (from 0.159) but with a 
very large BFA.  This is still below the investment hurdle. 
 
Fig.2.2c representing the fiscal-incentive-only scenario corresponds to the 
combined incentives scenario summarised in Fig. 2.1c.  The maximum 
attainable NPV/I is 0.143 with a very large BFA, representing a 38% 
improvement, but still insufficient to reach the investment hurdle. 
The conclusion from the results summarised in Fig. 2.1a though Fig. 2.2c 
is that, even with very high levels of BFAs (up to five times the current 
level) combined with lower PRT (down to 17.5%) and captured CO2 for 
EOR at zero cost may be inadequate to encourage CO2-EOR at Brae. 
The potential efficacy of investment uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR 
Figs. 3.1a to 3.2c summarise the results of applying various commercial 
and fiscal incentives to the CO2-EOR investment incorporating the 
investment uplift for SC.  The commercial incentive is as defined above 
while the two levels of fiscal incentives now include lower PRT and 





Table 3: Brae: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, with 
investment uplifts for SC and CO2 prices 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (CAPEX-based) 
with captured CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (CAPEX-based) 
with captured CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
Fig.3.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50%  Fig. 3.2a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 3.1b:  PRT @ 25%  Fig. 3.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  
Fig. 3.1c:  PRT @ 17.5% Fig. 3.2c: PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
Fig. 3.1a shows that at the current rates of PRT and SC commercial 
incentivisation alone (i.e. without investment uplift allowance) would 
generate an NPV/I = 0.091.  However, combining the commercial 
incentive with 62.5% investment uplift yields a stronger improvement in 
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the project’s profitability (126%) than does an application of the current 
BFA level (15%).  Nevertheless, the profitability index at NPV/I = 0.206 
is still below the assumed hurdle rate.  Increasing the investment uplift to 
80% increases the NPV/I to 0.238. 
 
The results summarised in Fig. 3.2a of the base case scenario of the 
fiscal-incentives-only regime follows the same reasoning as the 
corresponding combined incentivisation in Fig. 3.1a.  Paying £9/tCO2 
dampens the investment returns relative to the zero carbon price scenario 
at each level of the investment allowance.  The combined incentivisation 
scheme is much preferable to the investor. 
 
The results when the PRT rate in the case of combined incentives is 
lowered to 25% are summarised in Fig. 3.1b.  With an allowance of 
62.5% the NPV/I ratio = 0.256 which is 24% higher than the base case 
scenario.  The allowance was increased in stages to 80%, at which point 
the NPV/I = 0.288 which is 21% higher than the corresponding base case 
scenario and close to the assumed hurdle of 0.3. 
 
Fig. 3.2b summarises the experimental results when the PRT rate is 
reduced to 25% from the fiscal-incentive-only base case scenario.  When 
the investment allowance is 62.5% the NPV/I ratio is 0.172.  This is an 
improvement of 14% over the base case scenario, but 33% lower than the 
corresponding combined incentives case.  The NPV/I at the assumed 
maximum rate of 80% is 0.204.  This represents an 11% improvement 





Figs 3.1c and 3.2c summarise the results when the PRT rate is reduced 
further to 17.5% 
 
Before applying the investment uplift, the reduction in the PRT rate from 
50% to 17.5% increased the profitability index by 99% to 0.181 (from 
0.091) but this is still well below the investment hurdle.  Applying the 
investment uplift rate of 62.5% increases the profitability index further by 
44% to 0.296 which is very close to the assumed hurdle.  The hurdle rate 
of NPV/I = 0.300 is exactly satisfied when the allowance is raised to 65% 
rate.  Significantly, only 64% of the maximum available allowance of 
£800 million would have been used up.  Increasing the allowance to 80% 
improves the profitability index to 0.328. 
 
There are two noticeable features of Fig. 3.2c.  Firstly, the fiscal 
incentivisation through the investment uplift allowance coupled with 
reduction in the PRT rate was not strong enough to reach the required 
profitability threshold.  This is in spite of the major narrowing of the pre- 
and post-tax profitability index as the allowance rates increased.  Indeed, 
at the assumed 80% maximum allowance rate, the post-tax NPV/I 
(=0.222) is marginally higher than the pre-tax one (0.221).  Other things 
being equal, this is undesirable. 
 
The conclusions that can be reached from the analysis are that when 
either the BFA or investment uplift is based on the project’s CAPEX (1) 
the combined commercial and fiscal incentives are potentially more 
effective in encouraging CO2-EOR investments and, (2) the combined 
package incorporating the investment uplift is much more likely to 
encourage investment compared to the package incorporating BFAs at the 




The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR (Total cost-
basis) (partial OPEX) 
 
The next step in the analysis was an investigation of the relative efficacy 
of the incentives when the basis of the allowance is the project’s total cost 
rather than capital cost.  The total-cost-with-partial OPEX (TCWPO) is 
considered at this stage.  The maximum allowance is available at 
£10.91/bbl. (£80/tonne)
5
 of incremental reserves.  But, where necessary, 
the existing cap on the maximum available total allowance for a PRT 
field (£500 million) is lifted.  
 
  
                                                 
5
 See Fig.1. 
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Table 4: Brae: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, given BFAs 
(Total cost-based) and captured CO2 prices. 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with captured 
CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with captured 
CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
 Fig.4.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% Fig. 4.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 4.1b: PRT @ 25%  Fig. 4.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  
Fig. 4.1c:  PRT @ 17.5%  Fig. 4.2c:  PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
Comparing the results summarised in Fig. 4.1a with those in Fig. 2.1a, it 
is seen that the application of the current BFA using the TCWPO basis 
resulted in a 7% improvement in the NPV/I index over the CAPEX-basis 
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(0.112 v. 0.105).  The total amount of BFA used up increased by 54% but 
remains less than the maximum available of £500 million.  The 
application of five times the current unit BFA resulted in NPV/I = 0.196, 
which is an improvement of 23% over the corresponding CAPEX-based 
allowance.  However, the total amount of BFA used increases to 2.2 
times the current maximum available. 
 
Comparing Figs. 4.2a and 2.2a indicates the same pattern in the 
relationship between the profitability indices of the CAPEX- and 
TCWPO-based allowances.  As before, the induced BFA-only 
profitability indices in Fig. 4.2a are generally lower than the 
corresponding combined incentives package shown in Fig. 4.2a.  Indeed 
the highest NPV/I at 0.141 is only 72% of the combined incentives case. 
Adding to the combined incentives in Fig. 4.1a (base case), the further 
incentive of the PRT rate reduction to 25%, the results in Fig. 4.1b show 
a general improvement in the profitability indices.  Thus, when the 
current unit BFA is applied, the NPV/I improves by 45% (from 0.112 to 
0.162.  However, the maximum NPV/I = 0.246 in this scenario, even 
though higher than the base case by 26%, is still below the minimum 
threshold.  
The results summarised in Fig. 4.2b can be compared with those in Fig. 
4.1b in the case of the fiscal-incentives-only regime.  The combined 
incentives case along with the PRT reduction to 25% in this scenario 
generally improves the profitability indices but not so robustly.  Thus, 
unlike the 45% increase in profitability in the initial combined 
incentivisation scheme, the corresponding increase in this scenario is only 
37% (NPV/I = 0.078 v. NPV/I = 0.057).  In this scenario’s best case, the 
profitability index reaches 0.162, which, at 15% above the base case, 
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represents a relatively weak improvement compared to the combined 
incentives case. 
Fig. 4.1c summarises the results when the base case of the combined 
incentive scheme (in Fig. 4.1a) is enhanced by reducing the PRT rate to 
17.5%.  Applying the current unit BFA improves the profitability index 
(over the base case) by 80% (0.202 v. 0.112).  The index improves by 
42% to 0.286 if the current unit BFA is multiplied five times.  While not 
shown in Fig. 4.1c, the hurdle rate is marginally surpassed (NPV/I = 
0.307) if the current unit BFA was multiplied six times (to £40.91/bbl.). 
 
Fig 4.2c summarises the base case of the fiscal-incentives-only regime 
being further incentivised by reducing the PRT rate to 17.5%.  Applying 
the current unit BFA improves the NPV/I by 68% (again, less strongly 
than the corresponding combined incentives case) to 0.096.  Increasing 
the current unit BFA five times improves the profitability index by 88% 
to 0.180.  When the current unit BFA was multiplied six times it yielded 
NPV/I = 0.201.  Generally, as in the previous cases, the profitability 
indices of this scenario are significantly lower than in the corresponding 




The potential efficacy of uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR (Total cost-
basis) (partial OPEX) 
Table 5: Brae: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, given uplifts 
(Total cost-based) and captured CO2 prices 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total cost-
based) with captured CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total cost-
based) with captured CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
Fig.5.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% Fig. 5.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 5.1b:  PRT @ 25%  Fig. 5.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  
Fig. 5.1c:  PRT @ 17.5%  Fig. 5.2c: PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
In Fig. 5.1a, applying the uplift at the 62.5% rate on the TCWPO basis as 
part of the combined incentives package generated NPV/I = 0.223.  This 
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is 8% higher than the corresponding CAPEX-based allowance (in Fig. 
3.1a).  Increasing the allowance rate to 80% improves the NPV/I to 0.259. 
 
In Fig. 5.2a, NPV/I = 0.167 when the 62.5% allowance rate is applied in 
the fiscal-incentives-only case on TCWPO-basis.  This is 11% higher 
than the corresponding CAPEX-based allowance (in Fig. 3.2a).  The 
stronger improvement in profitability in this scenario compared to the 
corresponding combined incentives case in Fig. 5.1a is noteworthy.  
Increasing the allowance to 80% improves the profitability index to 0.204 
which is still 11% above the CAPEX-based allowance, but 21% lower 
than the corresponding combined incentive scheme. 
 
Further incentivising the combined incentives package by reducing the 
PRT rate to 25% produced the results summarised in Fig. 5.1b.  The 
reduction improves the profitability index over the base case (Fig. 5.1a) 
by 22% (0.272 v. 0.223) when the 62.5% allowance rate is applied.  By 
raising the allowance rate to 75% there is a 10% improvement in project 
profitability with NPV/I = 0.298.  An increase in the allowance rate to 
80% generates a 14% higher NPV/I = 0.309.  These results are interesting 
because they show that, compared to the corresponding CAPEX-based 
case (where the hurdle rate was not met), an adoption of the TCWPO can 
lead to the realisation of the hurdle rate with PRT reduced to 25%. 
 
In Fig. 5.2b, applying the 62.5% allowance rate and the 25% PRT rate 
from the fiscal-incentives-only base case (Fig. 5.2a) generates a 13% 
increase in the profitability index to 0.189 (from 0.167).  Increasing the 




Fig. 5.1c summarises the results of reducing the PRT rate in Fig. 5.1a to 
17.5%.  At the 62.5% allowance rate, the profitability index improves by 
40% to NPV/I = 0.312 (from 0.223).  This satisfies the assumed hurdle 
rate.  Compared to the results in Fig. 5.1b, the results of this scenario 
suggest that the 62.5% allowance when combined with a lower PRT 
(17.5%) and the joint incentives may encourage CO2-EOR investment.  
Increasing the allowance rate to 80% improves the profitability index to 
0.349. 
 
Fig. 5.2c shows the fiscal-incentives-only scenario corresponding to Fig. 
5.1c.  At 62.5% allowance rate, the PRT reduction to 17.5% generates a 
23% profitability improvement to NPV/I = 0.206.  While increasing the 
allowance rate to 80% raises the profitability index to NPV/I = 0.243 this 
is still below the hurdle rate. 
 
In sum, within the current and hypothetical ranges of the BFA and uplift 
allowances chosen in the study only a few instances of the combined 
incentives package delivered results that could incentivise CO2-EOR 
investment.  None of the fiscal-incentives-only regimes yielded outcomes 
that passed the investment hurdle.  One contributory explanation of the 
generally poor investment returns is the assumed commencement of the 
EOR project relatively late in field life, with low levels of remaining 
reserves and high water cut. 
 
Buzzard 
The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR (CAPEX-
basis) 
The results of the experiments investigating the possible effectiveness of 
an extension of BFAs alongside commercial incentives to encourage 
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CO2-EOR at Buzzard are presented in Table 6.  The project hurdle 
remains at NPV/I of 0.3 in this and all other cases.  The basis of the BFA 
allowance is the project’s CAPEX. 
 
Table 6: Buzzard: Sensitivity of NPV/I to variations in captured CO2 
prices, given BFAs (CAPEX-based) 
Current and hypothetical BFAs (CAPEX-
based) 
Current and hypothetical BFAs (CAPEX-
based) 
Fig.6.1a: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 




Fig 6.1a shows a summary of the results when the combined incentives 
package is applied to the Buzzard field.  At zero BFA but with zero price 
paid for CO2, the profitability index at NPV/I = 0.434 exceeds the hurdle 
rate.  Applying the current BFA of £6.82/barrel improves the profitability 
index marginally by 5% to NPV/I = 0.447.  Increasing the unit allowance 
to £34.1/bbl. improves the profitability index to NPV/I = 0.497. 
 
The results of the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only case are 
summarised in Fig. 6.1b.  Without the BFA profitability is slightly above 
the hurdle rate at NPV/I = 0.335.  Applying the current BFA improves the 
profitability by 3% to NPV/I = 0.348.  Increasing the unit BFA allowance 
to the maximum assumed in the study resulted in an 18% increase in the 




The foregoing results suggest that CO2-EOR investment at Buzzard is 
potentially promising.  This is due in part to the relatively larger volume 
of remaining reserves and comparatively low water cut at the 
commencement of CO2-EOR operations.  Being relatively close to the 
onshore CO2 hub and the backbone pipeline produces savings in transport 
costs. 
 
Given the field’s relative profitability with moderate incentives, further 
incentivisation schemes were deeded unnecessary.  However, by way of 
comparison the relative impact of the investment uplift allowance is 
shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7:  Buzzard: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in captured CO2 
prices, with uplifts for SC 
Current and hypothetical uplifts (CAPEX-
based)  
Current and hypothetical uplifts (CAPEX-
based)  
Fig.7.1a: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 




The results in Table 7 compared to those in Table 6 show that the 
investment uplift offers higher returns to CO2-EOR investments.  Thus, 
in Fig. 7.1a at the 62.5% rate, the NPV/I = 0.549 which is 23% higher 




The same conclusion is reached in the fiscal-incentives-only case 
summarised in Fig. 7.1b.  At the initial investment uplift rate of 62.5% 
and the BFA at £6.82/bbl., the former’s profitability index at NPV/I = 




The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR (CAPEX-
basis) 
The results of the experiments investigating the possible effectiveness of 
an extension of BFAs alongside commercial incentives to encourage 
CO2-EOR at Claymore are presented in Table 8.  The project investment 
hurdle remains a minimum NPV/I = 0.3 in this and all other cases.  The 





Table 8: Claymore: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, given 
BFAs (CAPEX-based) and CO2 prices. 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with CO2 
price=£9/tCO2 
Fig.8.1a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% Fig. 8.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 8.1b: PRT @ 25% Fig. 8.2b: PRT @ 25% 
  
Fig. 8.1c:  PRT @ 17.5% Fig. 8.2c:  PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
The results of the base case scenario of the application of the combined 
commercial and fiscal incentives package are summarised in Fig. 8.1a.  
The project is seen to be clearly viable before tax with NPV/I of 0.64.  
When only the commercial incentive was available NPV/I = 0.117.  
When the BFA was added at the current unit rate of £6.82/bbl., the 
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profitability index improved by 12% to 0.131.  Applying the study’s 
maximum hypothetical BFA of £34.1 per barrel further improved the 
profitability index to 0.188 which is still below the hurdle rate. 
 
In Fig. 8.2a the results of the corresponding (base case) fiscal-incentives-
only scenario indicate that the project remains viable before tax with 
NPV/I = 0.42.  After the current tax NPV/I = 0.073 which is 38% lower 
than the corresponding case with-commercial incentive. When the BFA at 
the rate of £6.82/bbl is applied, the NPV/I improves by 21% to 0.088. 
Increasing the BFA rate to the study’s maximum improves the 
profitability index to 0.145 which is 30% lower than the corresponding 
combined incentives case. 
 
Figs. 8.1b and 8.2b show summaries of further incentivisation by 
reducing the PRT rate to 25%.  The post-tax results remain below the 
investment threshold.  However, as can be seen in Fig. 8.1c the combined 
incentives scenario with PRT reduced to 17.5% plus BFA at the 
extremely high level of £34.1 per barrel produces NPV/I = 0.3.  At lower 
BFA levels the threshold is not reached.  With a CO2 price of £9 per 
tonne the hurdle is never passed.  The difference between the pre- and 
post-tax NPV/I ratios remains large. 
 
The potential efficacy of investment uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR 
(CAPEX-basis) 
The results of the experimental runs with investment uplifts (CAPEX-





Table 9: Claymore: Sensitivity of NPV/I to variations in PRT, 
assuming various uplifts (CAPEX-based) and CO2 prices 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (CAPEX-
based) with captured CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical u-HPHT uplifts (CAPEX-
based) with captured CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
Fig.9.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50%  Fig. 9.2a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 9.1b:  PRT @ 25%  Fig. 9.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  
Fig. 9.1c:  PRT @ 17.5% Fig. 9.2c: PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
The initial conditions in Fig. 9.1a summarising the combined incentives 
results are the same as those in Fig. 8.1a (BFA incentives case) and, 
therefore, require no further elaboration.  However, when the 62.5% 
uplift rate was applied the difference in the relative performance of the 
two allowances is apparent.  In this scenario the application of the rate of 
62.5% led to a 98% improvement in the profitability index (0.232 v. 
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0.117), while the initial improvement in the BFA case was only 12% 
(0.131 v. 0.117).  Increasing the uplift allowance to 80% improves the 
profitability index to 0.264. 
 
In Fig. 9.2a which summarises the results of the fiscal-incentives-only 
scenario corresponding to the combined incentives case in Fig. 9.1a, it 
can be seen that the profitability indices are generally lower and none 
meet the investment hurdle.   
 
In Fig. 9.1b it can be seen that even before applying the uplift allowance 
the reduction in the PRT rate to 25% by itself improves the profitability 
index by 53% over the base case in Fig. 9.1a.  Another feature of the 
results in this chart is that NPV/I = 0.299 and the threshold rate virtually 
attained at the 65% uplift rate.  At 70%, the NPV/I = 0.308.  Clearly, 
compared to the BFA, the threshold rate is reached with a smaller 
reduction in the required PRT rate (25% v. 17.5%). 
 
The investment hurdle is still not satisfied in Fig. 9.2b in the 
corresponding fiscal-incentives-only case, even with a very high uplift. 
 
In Fig. 9.1c complementing the combined commercial and fiscal 
incentives with PRT rate reduction to 17.5% greatly enhances 
profitability.  Thus, applying the 62.5% rate, NPV/I = 0.344. 
 
The main feature of Fig. 9.2c summarising the corresponding
6
 fiscal-
incentives-only is the near satisfaction of the investment hurdle.  NPV/I = 
0.294 with the very high 80% uplift rate.   
 
                                                 
6
 To Fig. 9.1c. 
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The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR (Total cost-
basis) 
Table 10 summarises the results of the various experimental runs 
designed to assess the efficacy of BFAs based on total cost. 
Table 10: Claymore: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, 
assuming various BFAs (Total cost-based) and captured CO2 prices. 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with captured 
CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical BFAs with captured 
CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
 Fig. 10.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% Fig. 10.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 10.1b: PRT @ 25%  Fig. 10.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  





Fig. 10.1a shows that when the initial BFA of £6.82/bbl is applied on the 
total-cost basis the profitability index is, at NPV/I = 0.137, 5% higher 
than the corresponding CAPEX-basis one. Increasing the BFA to the 
maximum in the study improved the NPV/I to 0.215 which is 14% higher 
that achieved with the equivalent CAPEX-basis.   
 
The fiscal-incentives-only results summarised in Fig. 10.2a, as in 
previous cases, fared worse than those in Fig. 10.1a with profitability well 
below the hurdle. 
 
Fig. 10.1b shows the summary results of supplementing the combined 
incentives package with a reduction in the PRT rate to 25%.  The best 
outcome from the investor’s perspective is an NPV/I = 0.277 with a very 
high BFA.  In the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only results 
summarised in Fig. 10.2b the best outcome is NPV/I = 0.212 with a very 
high BFA. 
 
More encouraging results can be seen in Fig. 10.1c which summarises the 
case of supplementing the combined incentives with a reduction in the 
PRT rate to 17.5%.  Applying a BFA rate of £27.28/bbl., the profitability 
index improves to 0.308.  In the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only case 
summarised in Fig. 10.2c, the best outcome is NPV/I = 0.245 with the 
highest rate of BFA. 
 
The potential efficacy of investment uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR 
(Total cost-basis with commercial incentive) 
Tables 11 and 12 summarise the results of the various experimental runs 
designed to assess the efficacy of the investment uplift allowances on a 
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total cost-basis.  Table 11 presents the combined-incentives results while 
Table 12 presents the fiscal-incentives-only results.   
 
 The focus here is on an assessment of the relative impact on the project’s 
profitability of using the total-cost-with-the-full OPEX basis or with-
partial-OPEX basis.  The total cost-with-the-partial OPEX summary 
results are on the LHS panels of the table while the total-cost-with-full-




Table 11: Claymore: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, 
assuming various investment uplifts (alternative Total cost-bases) 
and captured CO2 prices 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total 
cost -based) (% of partial OPEX) with captured 
CO2 price=£0/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total 
cost-based) (% of full OPEX) with captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 
Fig. 11.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% Fig. 11.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 11.1b:  PRT @ 25%  Fig. 11.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  
Fig. 11.1c:  PRT @ 17.5%  Fig. 11.2c: PRT @ 17.5%  
  
 
In comparing the summary results in Figs. 11.1a and 11.2a, it is seen that 
the latter set of results exhibit higher investment returns.  Thus, at the 
62.5% rate, the NPV/i = 0.313 in the full OPEX case.  This not only 
satisfies the investment hurdle but is 30% higher than the partial OPEX 
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case (NPV/I = 0.240).  Increasing the allowance rate to 80% magnifies 
the differences.  The full OPEX-basis case is now 34% higher (0.368 v. 
0.275).  
 
The results in Fig. 11.2a suggest that the full OPEX-basis case requires 
no further incentivisation through PRT reductions.  But the partial OPEX 
basis requires further incentivisation.  In Fig. 11.1b and 11.2b the 
combined-incentives package (in Figs. 11.1a and 11.1b) is supplemented 
with a reduction of the PRT rate to 25%.  At the 62.5% rate the partial 
OPEX basis passes the hurdle (NPV/I = 0.375 v. NPV/I = 0.303).  At the 
assumed top rate of 80%, the full OPEX basis produces a profitability 
index of 0.430 which is 28% higher than the partial OPEX one (0.337). 
 
 The results of further incentivisation by reducing the PRT rate to 17.5% 
are summarised in Figs. 11.1c and 11.2c.  At the 62.5% uplift rate, the 
improvement in profitability from the full OPEX-basis over that of the 
partial-OPEX one reduces to 20% (0.425 v. 0.353). 
 
The potential efficacy of investment uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR 
(Total cost-basis without commercial incentive) 




Table 12: Claymore: Sensitivity of NPV/i to variations in PRT, 
assuming various investment uplifts (alternative Total cost-bases) 
and captured CO2 prices 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total 
cost -based) (% of partial OPEX) with captured 
CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total 
cost-based) (% of full OPEX) with captured CO2 
price=£9/tCO2 
Fig. 12.1a: Base scenario:  PRT @ 50% Fig. 12.2a: Base scenario: PRT @ 50% 
  
Fig. 12.1b:  PRT @ 25%  Fig. 12.2b: PRT @ 25%  
  
 
Comparing the results in Figs. 12.1a and 12.2a, it can be seen that the 
relative superiority of the full-OPEX basis remains at 30% as in the 
combined incentives case, but both profitability indices (that is, of the 
full-and partial-OPEX bases) fall short of the hurdle rate (at 0.256 and 
0.197 respectively).  At the top rate of allowance considered the 
investment performance increases to 33% (NPV/I = 0.307 v. NPV/I = 
0.231).  The full-OPEX basis satisfies the investment selection criterion 
while the partial-OPEX basis does not. 
 
The summaries of the results when the fiscal-only incentives are 
supplemented with a reduction in the PRT rate to 25% are presented in 
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Figs. 12.1b and 12.2b.  At the 62.5% rate, the full-OPEX basis passes the 
investment hurdle, and is 48% higher than the partial-OPEX one (NPV/I 
= 0.350 v. NPV/I = 0.237).  At the assumed 80% top rate, the profitability 
index of the full-OPEX basis improves to 0.416 which is 53% higher than 
the partial-OPEX basis (0.272).  The pre- and post-tax NPV/I ratios of the 
full-OPEX basis are virtually equal at the top rate of allowance. 
 
Though not shown graphically, the OPEX-basis scheme eventually (with 
NPV/I = 0.304) passes the hurdle rate when the fiscal-incentives are 
supplemented by a reduction of the PRT rate to 17.5% and the allowance 
rate set at the extremely high level of 80%.   
 
Miller 
The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR (CAPEX-
basis) 
The results of the experiments investigating the possible effectiveness of 
an extension of BFAs alongside commercial incentives to encourage 
CO2-EOR at a reopened Miller field are presented in Table 13.  The 
project hurdle remains a minimum NPV/I of 0.3 in this and all other 
cases.  The allowance is CAPEX-based.  Further incentivisation 
accomplished through reduction in the Supplementary Charge from the 





Table 13: Miller: Sensitivity of NPV/I to variations in CO2 prices, 
given BFAs (CAPEX-based) 
Current and hypothetical BFAs (CAPEX-
based) 
Current and hypothetical BFAs (CAPEX-
based) 
Fig. 13.1a: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 and SC = 32% 
Fig. 13.2a: Alternative base case  scenario: 
captured CO2 price=£9/tCO2 and SC = 32% 
  
Fig. 13.1b: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 and SC = 25% 
Fig. 13.2b: Alternative base case  scenario: 
captured CO2 price=£9/tCO2 and SC = 32% 
  
 
It can be seen in Fig. 13.1a that, with zero CO2 price, the pre-tax NPV/I 
ratio exceeds 0.5.  Without any BFA the post-tax NPV/I index is 0.246.  
If BFA was introduced at £6.82/bbl., the index improves by 6% to NPV/I 
= 0.261.  Increasing the BFA four-fold to £27.28/bbl. produces an index 
that just passes the hurdle (NPV/I = 0.304).  A further increase to 
£34.10/bbl. improves the index to NPV/I = 0.318.  
  
The results of the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only scenario 
summarised in Fig. 13.2a show that without the commercial incentive the 
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pre-tax NPV/I ratio exceeds 0.46.  Post-tax, before any BFA and 
commercial incentive apply, the profitability index is 29% worse off 
(0.174 v. 0.246).  Applying the maximum BFA rate of £34.10/bbl. 
improves the profitability index to 0.247 which is still below the hurdle 
rate.   
 
Fig. 13.1b shows a summary of the results when the combined incentives 
scheme is supplemented with a reduction in the SC rate to 25%.  With 
these the profitability index improves by 19% to 0.293 (compared to 
0.246 in Fig. 13.1a).  Unlike in the SC=32% case, supplementing the 
combined incentives package with the initial BFA (=£6.82/bbl.) satisfies 
the hurdle rate, with the NPV/I = 0.304 (16% improvement over the 
corresponding SC=32% case).     
 
In Fig. 13.2b, supplementing the fiscal-incentives-only package with the 
reduction in the SC rate to 25% failed to satisfy the investment hurdle.  
The profitability index attained with BFA = £34.10/bbl. is NPV/I = 0.264.  
 
The potential efficacy of investment uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR 
(CAPEX-basis) 
The results through the introduction of CAPEX-based investment uplifts 





Table 14:  Miller: Sensitivity of NPV/I to variations in CO2 prices, 
given uplifts 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts 
(CAPEX-based)  
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts 
(CAPEX-based)  
Fig. 14.1a: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 




The pre-allowance NPV/I indices in this scenario (Fig. 14.1a) and the 
corresponding BFA case (Fig. 13.1a) are the same at NPV/i =0.246.  
However, the application of the 62.5% investment uplift produces a 
strong improvement in the profitability index by 47% to NPV/I = 0.361.  
Further increases in the rate of the uplift allowance to 80% enhanced the 
profitability index to 0.393. 
 
In the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only results summarised in Fig. 
14.2a, the hurdle rate is just passed when the allowance is set at 70%, 
with the index being 0.303.   
 
The potential efficacy of BFAs to incentivise CO2-EOR (Total cost-
basis) 
The results of the experimental runs with BFA on total cost-basis are 





Table 15: Miller: Sensitivity of NPV/I to variations in CO2 prices, 
given BFAs (Total cost-based) 
Current and hypothetical BFAs (TC-based)  Current and hypothetical BFAs (TC-based) 
Fig. 15.1a: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 with SC @ 32% 
Fig. 15.1b: Alternative scenario: captured CO2 
price=£9/tCO2 with SC @ 32% 
  
Fig. 15.1b: Base scenario: captured CO2 
price=£0/tCO2 with SC @ 25% 
Fig. 15.2b: Alternative scenario: captured CO2 
price=£9/tCO2 with SC @ 25% 
  
 
Comparing the results in Figs. 13.1a and 15.1a shows that the profitability 
indices in the latter are slightly higher.  Thus, at the initial BFA of 
£6.82/bbl., the total cost-based index in Fig. 15.1a is only 1% higher than 
the CAPEX-based one in Fig 13.1a.  At the very high BFA rate of 
£34.10/bbl., the difference in the profitability indices increases to 5% 
(NPV/I = 0.334 v. NPV/I = 0.318). 
 
The foregoing pattern is repeated when Figs. 13.2a and 15.2a 
summarising the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only cases are 




The results when the combined-incentives package is supplemented with 
a reduction in the SC to 25% are summarised in Fig. 15.1b.  By itself, the 
reduction in SC leads to an improvement of 19% in the profitability index 
to 0.293 (from 0.246, with SC at 32%).  Once the initial BFA at 
£6.82/bbl. is added, the profitability index improves to 0.307.  It is 
noteworthy that with SC at 32% this condition was not satisfied until the 
BFA was raised to £27.28/bbl.  
 
The potential efficacy of investment uplifts to incentivise CO2-EOR 
(Total cost-basis) 
Table 16 shows the summary comparisons of the results of the investment 






Table 16: Miller: Sensitivity of NPV/I to variations in PRT, assuming 
various uplifts (alternative Total cost-bases) and captured CO2 prices 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total 
cost -based) (% of partial OPEX) with captured 
CO2 price=£9/tCO2 
Current and hypothetical investment uplifts (Total 
cost-based) (% of full OPEX) with captured CO2 
price=£9/tCO2 
Fig.16.1a: Combined incentives on total cost basis 
(partial OPEX) SC @ 32% 
Fig.16.2a: Combined incentives on total cost basis 
(full OPEX) SC @ 32% 
  
Fig. 16.1b:  : Fiscal-incentives-only on total cost 
basis (partial OPEX) SC @ 32% 
Fig. 16.2b: Fiscal-incentives-only on total cost basis 
(full OPEX) SC @ 32% 
  
 
In Figs. 16.1a and 16.2a the project is viable with 62.5% uplift whether 
the basis of the allowance is partial OPEX (TCWPO) or total cost with 
full OPEX (TCWFO).  The allowance based on the latter results in a 
profitability index that is 14% higher than the former-based one (NPV/I = 
0.411 v. NPV/I = 0.362) Increasing the allowance rate to 80% improves 
the relative efficiency of TCWFO.  The gap in the resulting profitability 
indices widens to 16% (NPV/I = 0.458 v. NPV/I = 0.394).   
   
Comparing the corresponding fiscal-incentives-only results in Figs. 16.1b 
and 16.2b reveals that the scenario with TCWFO passes the hurdle rate, 
48 
 
but with TCWPO it does not (NPV/I = 0.373 v. NPV/I = 0.290).  When 
compared with the 14% advantage in the corresponding combined-
incentives case, the 29% advantage in the profitability of the TCWFO-
based allowance suggests its importance to marginal projects.  As in the 
combined-incentives case, increasing the allowance rate to 80% widens 
the relative efficiency of TCWFO.  The resulting profitability index is 
33% higher than the TCWPO-based one (NPV/I = 0.428 v. NPV/I = 
0.322).   
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper the case for tax incentives to encourage the activity of CO2 
EOR in the UKCS has been examined within the context of a possible 
CCS cluster in the Central North Sea/Moray Firth region.  Four fields 
with recognised CO2 EOR potential were examined with detailed 
financial simulation modelling which recognised the physical constraints 
on the CO2 EOR activity in the fields.  In most, but not all, cases the pre-
tax returns were acceptable at an oil price of $120 per barrel.  This price 
reflects the start date of the investments in 2020.  Cases of CO2 purchase 
prices of £0 and £9 per tonne of CO2 were examined to highlight the 
effects of non-tax costs/incentives on the prospective returns.  The 
moderate price of £9/tonne was found to significantly affect the returns. 
 
Many experiments were conducted involving application of the BFA for 
SC to CO2 EOR at many different rates.  Further experiments involved 
the introduction of the investment uplift allowance for SC at several 
different rates.  Experiments were also conducted on the effects of 
including operating costs (all or part) in the base for the BFA and uplift 
allowances.  Yet further experiments were undertaken with reduced rates 




The effectiveness of the various schemes in incentivising investment in 
CO2 EOR was found to vary greatly.  In general the uplift allowance 
performed moderately well, but, where the CO2 had to be purchased at 
£9/tonne, the inclusion of at least part of the operating costs in the eligible 
base was found to be necessary to make the scheme effective.  In some 
cases the rate of the allowance had to be very high to produce the 
necessary incentive.  This could raise question of cost-consciousness.  
Rate reductions in the PRT and/or SC rate could produce the desired level 
of incentive, and could do so with more moderate levels of uplift 
allowance.  To some extent there is a trade-off between size of uplift and 
tax rates. 
REFERENCES 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2009. PILOT Meeting, 
10 November, 2009, London, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101227132010/http:/www.pilottaskforce
.co.uk )  
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2013. BFA Guidance, 
London 2013. 
EIA, (2014) International Energy Outlook, 2014 
Kemp, A.G., Kasim, S., 2013. The Economics of CO2-EOR cluster 
developments in the UK Central North Sea, Energy Policy, 62, pp.1344-
1355. 
Melzer, L.S., 2012. Carbon dioxide Enhanced Oil recovery (CO2 EOR):  
Factors Involved in Adding Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage 
(CCUS) to Enhanced Oil Recovery,  prepared for the National Enhanced Oil 
Recovery Initiative, Center for Climate and energy Solutions, USA. 
National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), 2014. Carbon dioxide 
enhanced oil recovery: a critical domestic energy, economic, and 
environmental opportunity, (http://neori.org/publications/neori-report/)  
